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In some countries, state-run enterprises extract and sell natural resources. In others, resources are privately owned but subject to government regulation. In either case development economists asked to advise on resource policy are discovering that the theory of the firm requires substantial revision when the firm extracts a natural resource. The following questions are among many that arise: * Suppose a state-owned enterprise is charged with selling a natural resource on the world market so that discounted profits are maximized (discounted profits refer to the equivalent value today of all expected profits in the future).I For a small country-that is, one that sells its natural resources on world markets but that does not have a large enough market share to be able to influence world prices (a so-called price-taker)-can it be a mistake to extract to the point where the cost of extracting an additional unit (the marginal cost) equals the market price? Is it ever sensible to refrain altogether from extracting a resource, even though the current price exceeds the marginal cost of extracting the first unit-that is, even though it is profitable to begin extracting? * How does the fact that credit may be more tightly rationed (and interest rates higher) in one country than another affect the rationed country's relative rate of natural resource extraction? Assume that the goal of each country is to maximize national wealth and that each has approximately the same extraction costs, reserves, and expectations about future prices. * Suppose a government decides to restrict the extraction of a resource that is privately owned and extracted because the resource is deemed exceptionally valuable (such as tropical hardwoods in Cameroon) or because the extraction process generates pollution (such as gold mining in Brazil, which uses mercury, and in Ghana, which uses arsenic). Why is it a mistake in such cases to give extractors a grace period before the restrictions go into effect to mitigate the dislocations that such policies will cause?
The theory of natural resource extraction can illuminate these and other questions. What follows is a self-contained introduction with suggestions for further readings. (Space limitations prevent consideration of misallocations that result when a natural resource is common property and how such problems can be attenuated. A valuable discussion of this topic is contained in Dasgupta 1982.) The Basic Model Natural resource economics traces its origins to classic articles by L. C. Gray (1914) and Harold Hotelling (1931) (for a comparison of Gray's and Hotelling's contributions, see Crabbe 1983 ). Gray examined the supply behavior over time of an individual extractor who anticipates a sequence of real prices and attempts to maximize discounted profits. This is the relevant case for a "small" country. Hotelling extended Gray's theory by predicting the sequence of market prices that Gray took as given.
Supply Behavior of a Small Extractor Selling on World Markets
The supply behavior of the owner of a depletable resource such as oil differs from that of the firm portrayed in intermediate microeconomics textbooks. According to these texts, a price-taking firm with no fixed costs and increasing marginal costs will adjust production in all periods so that its marginal cost of production in each period either equals the market price in that period or, if production is zero and can be contracted no further, exceeds it. This result can be understood intuitively. If the cost of producing an additional unit is greater than the price that will be paid for that unit, then the supplier will lose by increasing production; indeed, he will benefit from contracting output because he will save in costs more than he will lose in revenues. If the marginal cost is less than the price, the supplier can raise current profits by increasing production. When the firm is the extractor of a nonrenewable resource, however, such behavior might require the extraction of more reserves than the firm has available.
In such cases, some modification of the standard theory is clearly required. But what modification is appropriate? It might at first seem that an extractor should equate the marginal cost of production to the market price in every period before reserves run out, after which there are no choices left. But that strategy would not maximize discounted profits. A barrel of oil saved until after the proposed date of exhaustion could in some cases be sold later at a larger discounted profit.
The important element missing in the above discussion is the principle of opportunity cost. A barrel of oil extracted and sold today is a barrel unavailable in the future. 2 In deciding whether to extract and sell an additional barrel today, the extractor must consider not only the cost of pumping the barrel, but also the cost of forgoing the highest profit that could have been earned if the oil had instead been pumped and sold in the future. It is optimal to adjust extraction in any given period until this more inclusive definition of marginal cost, or "augmented marginal cost," equals the market price or exceeds it when extraction is cut to zero.
When marginal cost is redefined in this way, the old maxim once again is valid: a firm produces in each period to the point where its (augmented) marginal cost equals the market price. But beneath the apparent simplicity of this maxim lies a wealth of subtlety. The maxim implies, for example, that the current extraction rate of a private owner of a natural resource depends not only on the current price, as in the standard theory, but on expectations about future prices. These price expectations determine the opportunity cost of additional current extraction. A competitive supplier that expects future prices to be sufficiently low compared with the current price may extract and sell intensively in the current period, judging the opportunity cost of additional extraction to be small. But if future prices are expected to be sufficiently high, the same current price may elicit no extraction whatsoever today.
What sales path will maximize the discounted profit of a small (price-taking) oil extractor or state-owned oil company selling on world markets? Suppose that after determining a sequence of extraction and sales that uses all the underground reserves in the most profitable way, the company finds an additional barrel of oil. Assume that extracting and selling this barrel at the most propitious time would increase net discounted profits by a certain amount, to be denoted by x. Because x would also be the loss in net discounted profits if the extractor had one less barrel of initial reserves, it represents what the extractor would lose if he was forced to cut back extraction by a barrel in one period to offset a barrel of additional extraction in another period. That is, x can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of additional extraction expressed in initial period dollars.
If the value of x were known, the optimal extraction path could be determined by computing the firm's augmented marginal cost in each period and then adjusting extraction so that the augmented marginal cost equaled the price in that period (or exceeded it when extraction was cut to zero). But how is x determined? Clearly, this opportunity cost cannot be so small that it encourages aggregate extraction that exceeds underground reserves. Nor can induced extraction be so large that reserves are left in the ground indefinitely, since the opportunity cost of additional pumping would be zero rather than x. The opportunity cost must be such that planned cumulative extraction exactly matches underground reserves: this condition uniquely determines x and, consequently, the optimal path of extraction.
Even this elementary analysis illuminates questions of practical policy that might otherwise appear baffling. Each of the problems mentioned in the introduction ceases to be puzzling once attention is properly refocused on the opportunity cost of current extraction and on how that cost changes when a new policy is anticipated.
Expanding state-run oil production so that the marginal cost of pumping equals the market price sounds sensible but is not. Such pumping is excessive because it fails to account for the profit forgone when an additional barrel is pumped. Indeed, if this opportunity cost is sufficiently high, no amount of the resource should be extracted today even though the current price exceeds the current marginal cost of extracting the first unit.
It is often thought that a rise in the real rate of interest will not affect natural resource extraction if it has no effect on market prices. An increase in the real rate of interest will, however, cause the extractor to pump more in early periods and less in later ones. When the interest rate rises, the opportunity cost of extracting another barrel declines because the future profit (from the barrel that must be forgone) is worth less today. Hence, even if the marginal cost of pumping does not shift, the augmented marginal cost in early periods will fall. As a result, the same sequence of prices would trigger an initial surge in extraction on properties that are privately owned. However, the opportunity cost component would increase at a faster rate than it would have if the real interest rate had remained unchanged. The augmented marginal cost beyond some date would be higher, which would eventually reduce extraction below what it otherwise would have been.
This example can be reinterpreted to explain differences in the behaviors of two countries selling the same natural resource on the world market. Assume that both countries have approximately the same underground reserves and costs of extraction. If credit is rationed more tightly in one country, that country should extract more rapidly in the near term in order to maximize national wealth.
Officials who propose shutting down a polluting gold mine or a leaking landfill but who permit a grace period to mitigate the dislocations caused by the closure may aggravate the very problems they seek to solve. Premature closing lowers the opportunity cost of extracting an additional unit before the shutdown. Consequently, the augmented marginal cost in each period before the date of closing is lower than it was before the policy was announced. If the sequence of world prices is unchanged, the polluter will find it profitable to intensify mining throughout the grace period. A similar policy response would occur if the extracted resource were the remaining space in a polluting landfill. Indeed, in the U.S. solid waste industry, the frenzied dumping in landfills during the grace periods preceding mandated closings is quaintly termed "stuffing" (Ley, Macauley, and Salant 1994) .
Imposing an export tax on tropical hardwoods may have a similar effect if policymakers give loggers time to react. Because loggers anticipate that they will receive less net profit from exports after the tax is imposed, cutting a tree has a lower opportunity cost than it did before they learned of the future export tax. If the price sequence does not change, more logging will occur before the tax is imposed and less afterwards. The anticipatory logging may be massive if it does not unduly increase marginal costs. As a result, the very trees the policy is intended to protect may be harvested before the tax is imposed.
A similar perverse response is possible at the global level. To combat global warming caused by carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels, a tax on the carbon content of these fuels has been proposed. If the tax is phased in gradually, carbon dioxide emissions may increase in the short run.
Efforts to mitigate painful economic dislocations resulting from policy interventions need not backfire. Financial compensation, for example, would have none of the allocative effects discussed above. What the preceding examples suggest, however, is that more than heartfelt generosity is required when deciding how best to mitigate such dislocations.
Determining Prices for Resources
Hotelling (1931) extended Gray's analysis of the extraction of price-taking firms by determining the sequence of prices that balances supply and demand in every year. Hotelling made the useful simplification that all firms have the same expectations about future prices and that these expectations are subsequently borne out. It is simplest at the outset to assume that each unit can be extracted at constant marginal cost.
In this case, a firm can determine the present value of the revenue it would expect to receive, net of extraction costs, from producing and selling a unit of the resource in any year, given its expectations about future prices. 3 Leaving any reserves unexploited forever is foolish as long as the net price (the excess of the market price over the constant per-unit cost of extraction) is strictly positive in some year. Yet selling any of the resource when the net price in a later year is expected to have a larger present value is also foolish. Hence, the supply behavior of each firm is to sell its entire reserve during years when the present value of the net price is highest. (Under the previous analyses, the present value of this net price is the value x.) Given this supply behavior, there turns out to be only one series of prices at or below the choke price (the lowest price that generates zero demand) that balances supply and demand in every year. Because prices below the choke price induce positive demand, market equilibrium requires that demand be matched by an equal supply. One condition must be satisfied for producers to supply the resource in every period: net prices must grow at the rate of interest. A numerical example may help to illustrate this fundamental condition. Suppose the interest rate is 10 percent and the net price per barrel of oil is $20. If the net price is not expected to grow to $22 next year, it pays to extract more oil in the current year, because the income will earn 10 percent interest. If the net price is expected to go above $22-that is, to grow faster than the rate of interest-the producer will have no incentive at all to pump oil in the current period, because any barrel pumped today will (even after interest receipts) be worth less in a year than a barrel pumped and sold a year from now.
Many price paths involve the net price rising at the rate of interest, but only one path generates cumulative demand equal to aggregate reserves. Any lower price path would induce cumulative demand that exceeded industry reserves; consequently, the industry would be unable to satisfy demand in some year. Any higher price path would induce cumulative demand that fell short of industry reserves; consequently, consumers would be unwilling to purchase all the oil offered for sale in some year. For supply to match demand in every year, cumulative demand must match industry reserves.
If extraction costs are zero, the dictum that the net price must rise in successive years by the interest rate implies that the price itself rises by that factor. In reality, of course, extraction costs are never zero. Whenever they are positive, a price increase equal to the interest rate would cause the net price to rise by more than the interest rate. For example, suppose the price per barrel of oil is $30 and the net price is $25. A 10 percent price rise (the rate of interest) would boost the net price from $25 to $28, or by more than 10 percent. That difference would give every extractor an incentive to postpone extraction rather than satisfy current demand. If such imbalances are to be avoided, the price in successive years must rise by less than the rate of interest.
The price path is determined by the size of aggregate reserves. 4 The larger these underground stocks, the smaller the difference between the initial price and the marginal extraction cost, the smaller the percentage increase in the price initially, and the longer the time required for the reserves to be depleted.
Market Power in the Extraction Industry
Because natural resources often tend to be geographically concentrated and because firms without access to a particular resource cannot enter an extraction industry, such industries tend to have noncompetitive elements (see Hotelling 1931) . If a single extractor owns all underground reserves and sells the resource at the same price per unit, which may vary over time, the monopolist will plan extraction so that the marginal profit (the excess of marginal revenue over marginal cost) received from selling another unit of the resource in another year is equal, in discounted terms, to the marginal profit received from selling it this year. In other words, the monopolist will plan extraction so that there is no gain from extracting more in one period and less in another.
How does such behavior affect market prices over time? Even the simplest cases are ambiguous. Assume a fixed real rate of interest and costless extraction. Under competition, the price is predicted to rise each year by the interest factor so long as all shifts in demand are foreseen. Under the same circumstances, a monopolist would extract enough so that marginal revenues would rise each year by the interest factor. Unfortunately, when shifts in demand are fully anticipated, the implied path of extraction might yield virtually any path of prices.
If the demand in future years does not shift, the monopolist always finds it optimal to raise prices over time-by less than the interest factor in all but exceptional cases, where the insensitivity of consumer demand to price might lead a monopolist to raise the resource price faster (Stiglitz 1976) .5
The surge in oil prices in 1973 stimulated research into the strategic interplay between resource cartels such as the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and independent extractors. Unfortunately, these models were built before economists gained their current level of understanding of the subtleties of multistage strategic games so even the most sophisticated models contain conceptual weaknesses. (See Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani 1991 on various attempts to model recent developments in the world oil market.) In addition, most models (including Weitzman 1976 and Salant 1982) treat OPEC as a monolith that maximizes the joint profits of its members, although, as Bain (1948) pointed out, joint profit maximization is unlikely in the absence of side payments.
Technologies for Energy
The analysis has to be modified when it departs from the assumptions underlying the Hotelling model. In the scenario discussed in this section, the analysis again revolves around the fundamental principle that for supply to occur in various time periods, the net price must increase over time by the rate of interest.
Extracting Oil Reserves at Different Marginal Costs
If the products of different firms are indistinguishable in the eyes of consumers, they will be purchased at the same time only if they sell at the same price. If firms have different but constant marginal costs of extraction, firms with the lowest marginal cost will operate first while the others wait. Only after firms with the lowest-cost reserves exhaust their stocks will firms with higher extraction costs operate.
To understand why, suppose there are only two cost levels, high and low. High-cost and low-cost extractors cannot operate simultaneously in successive years because any price increase that makes the high-cost extractor indifferent to selling in one year or the next will prompt the low-cost extractor to sell only in the earlier year. A high-cost extractor will be indifferent about selling in adjacent years only if the net price is expected to rise by the interest rate, but that would necessarily cause the net price of the low-cost firm to rise by less than the interest rate, making it more profitable for the low-cost firm to sell only in the earlier year. Nor can the high-cost firm extract for a succession of years before the low-cost firm operates. During the entire phase when the net price of the high-cost firm rises at the rate of interest, the net price of the lowcost firm rises by a smaller factor, giving it an incentive to extract its entire reserve at the outset of the phase. Instead, the low-cost firm extracts during an initial period and then, when its reserves are depleted, the high-cost firm extracts. During the first phase, the high-cost producer always finds postponing extraction until the second phase to be profitable. At the same time, the low-cost firm never regrets having extracted all of its reserves during the first phase.
If, on the contrary, every firm owned some reserves at each cost level, neither the competitive price path nor the total supply in any year would change. Each firm would now extract in every year, but all low-cost oil would still be extracted before any high-cost oil was. The extraction technology in this case is said to exhibit "depletion effects"; each firm's marginal cost of extraction rises as its remaining reserves decline.
The most efficient way to extract reserves is in the order of their constant marginal costs. 6 As long as the government does not intervene, a competitive or a monopolized industry would extract reserves in this order.
Governments, of course, do intervene in resource markets and may pervert this sensible pattern of resource exploitation. Gold provides an important example. Gold costs approximately $300 an ounce to extract from beneath the ground but can be removed at virtually no cost from the stockpiles of governments and international financial institutions. Official stockpiles are vast, equaling twenty years' worth of world extraction at the 1992 rate of 64 million ounces. Official stockpiles were accumulated during an era when gold played a central role in international monetary arrangements. But it no longer plays that role. Only inertia can account for the retention of such vast stockpiles. As a 1993 article in the Economist remarked: "Strip away history and it is ludicrous that central banks in industrial countries still hold, on average, 40 percent of their foreign reserves in this metal.... If central banks were to construct their portfolio from scratch, they would hold little (if any) gold." 7 Yet, society extracts high-cost gold reserves while zero-cost official stocks go unutilized. Henderson, Irons, and Salant (1993) have shown that governments could earn approximately $75 billion without adversely affecting the private sector if they corrected this production inefficiency. 8
Cost-Increasing Depletion Effects versus Cost-Reducing Technological Change
In principle, extraction costs may rise over time as lower-cost reserves are depleted and higher-cost reserves remain to be exploited. If technological change causes the marginal cost of extraction to fall as time passes, the price need no longer strictly increase over time when demand is unchanged. The price need not change at all if the rate of decline in the marginal cost increases the net price by exactly the interest factor. If the marginal cost is expected to decline by a larger percentage, the price may fall. Norgaard (1975) investigated empirically the extent to which improvements in the technology of extraction offset depletion effects. He found that, although costs of oil extraction tended to increase as depletion occurred, cost increases would have been much larger in the absence of technological change: "Overall, the decline in resource quality out-weighed new technology, and the real cost of successful wells increased 64 percent. This study shows, however, that the cost would have risen by 233 percent if there had been no improvement in knowledge and inputs" (p. 266). Norgaard's finding may explain in part the absence of an upward trend that Barnett and Morse (1963) 
Diminishing Returns in Resource Extraction
If, as Gray assumed, increases in a firm's rate of extraction cause its marginal cost to increase because of diminishing returns (that is, the faster the rate of extraction, the more effort is required and the larger the marginal cost), Hotelling's analysis must be modified. A firm choosing an extraction path has maximized its discounted profits only if the difference between price and marginal cost in the first year is the same as the discounted value of this difference in every subsequent year. When the demand curve does not shift over time, the price of the resource will rise in successive years (although more slowly than the interest factor). If demand for the resource falls overtime, however, and the firm anticipates these shifts, the direction of the change in prices will depend on whether marginal costs are constant or increasing. To understand this result, recall that the excess of the price over the marginal cost of extraction must increase over time by the interest factor. If the marginal cost is constant, the price will increase. But if marginal cost instead depends on how much is extracted, the excess of price over marginal cost can increase over time by the interest factor even though the market price is declining. For this to occur, extraction must decline. This phenomenon might occur in equilibrium if extractors anticipated that the demand curve for the resource would fall over time. Firms might then extract more initially and less in successive periods and yet, because of a decline in demand, the amount people would want to purchase at the lower price would match the declining supply in each period.
Producing a Perfect Substitute for Oil: the Deus ex Machina Called the Backstop
Forecasts about the future prices of oil (and other natural resources) are affected by one's assumptions about new sources of energy that might serve as a backstop. From Nordhaus (1973) it is standard to assume that the next energy source will be competitively held, inexhaustible, and operated at a constant marginal cost. From this assumption, it is almost invariably argued that the marginal cost of producing the so-called backstop acts as a future ceiling on the price of oil and will therefore induce a drop in the current price of oil. For example, Nordhaus (1979) estimated that, in a world without OPEC and other noncompetitive producers, the price of oil under competition would have been as low as $3 a barrel in 1975 (in 1975 dollars) because of extractors' anticipations of future backstop production.
Such conclusions, however, do not follow from the explicit assumptions made above but from additional assumptions that, if made explicit, might be regarded by some as wishful thinking. Whether the backstop represents fusion or some other inexhaustible energy source, the capacity to deliver it on a scale that can replace oil is currently unavailable. 9 It is unrealistic to assume that this capacity could be created costlessly. If it cannot be, then no backstop producer would undertake the costly expansion of capacity merely to receive a price per barrelequivalent equal to the marginal operating cost.
If backstop capacity could be expanded at a constant marginal cost, this expansion would be deferred until the moment the backstop is needed because there would be no cost-saving in spreading the buildup of capacity over a long period, and it is always beneficial to defer costs. Because efforts to expand capacity are undertaken in advance of production from the backstop, it seems plausible to assume that backstop expansion involves increasing marginal costs. This assumption implies that compressing a task into a short period is more costly than building ahead of time.
For simplicity, assume that the initial capacity of the backstop is zero, and consider alternative cost scenarios under which this capacity can be expanded. If capacity could be expanded costlessly, as the literature assumes, then the marginal operating cost of the backstop would serve as a ceiling on the oil price, and the initial oil price would be comparatively low. At the other extreme, if expanding backstop capacity is prohibitively expensive, even though the backstop would be cheap to operate once expanded, it cannot serve as a ceiling on the oil price because for all practical purposes it is not a feasible option. In fact, the current oil price would be the same as if no backstop existed. Thus, in both cases, the price path depends on a factor not typically addressed: the marginal cost of expanding backstop capacity.
The intermediate case, where the marginal cost of capacity expansion is neither zero nor infinite and increases with the rate of expansion, seems the most plausible. In such a case, backstop expansion would begin before the price reached the marginal operating cost so that the needed capacity would be built in the most economical way. A given level of capacity would be provided at lowest cost when the discounted marginal cost of expansion is the same in all periods. Therefore the marginal cost of expanding capacity before the backstop is in operation would itself grow by the interest factor, which implies that expansion would proceed at an increasing rate until the backstop begins to be sold. At this point, the price must overshoot the backstop's marginal operating cost; otherwise, the expansion would be unprofitable because the investment to build capacity would not be recovered. Once the price overshoots the marginal operating cost, however, the backstop must operate at full capacity. The net price would continue to rise by the interest factor, inducing continued extraction. The price would rise because the expansion in the backstop is less than the reduction in extraction of the oil it is replacing. Eventually the price would peak, extraction of oil would cease, and backstop production would remain at capacity. The continued expansion of the backstop would then result in a price that declines to the marginal operating cost (for further analysis, see Switzer and Salant 1986 ).
Although such overshooting will occur only in the distant future, its consequences will be felt immediately. Oil withheld for use during the overshooting phase is unavailable earlier. As a result, even if its marginal operating cost is constant and the underlying technology is licensed competitively, the backstop may not serve as a potent force in depressing the current price.
Aboveground Storage
Because natural resources are sometimes stored above ground, it is important to understand how such additional opportunities affect resource markets. In principle, three kinds of costs are associated with either aboveground or underground storage: costs of acquisition, costs of maintenance, and costs of extraction. In the case of underground storage, oil is never purchased from the market to augment reserves because the cost of forcing it below ground is prohibitive. Maintaining reserves under ground or above ground is typically costless, however. Hence, the focus is on the costs of extraction. In the case of aboveground storage, the costs of augmenting or depleting a stockpile are typically negligible, and the focus is on the costs of protecting and preserving stocks.
For stocks to be held above ground, the price must rise by more than the interest factor to compensate for the additional costs incurred in maintaining the stockpile. Recall that the price would rise by less than the interest factor if all stocks were instead held below ground and a positive cost had to be incurred to extract them. Although the price would rise in both cases by the interest factor if extraction and storage costs were zero, even then extractors and aboveground stockpilers would sometimes behave in fundamentally different ways. Even if storage and extraction costs are zero, there remains one essential difference between aboveground and belowground storage: while aboveground stockpiles are often augmented by purchases from the market, underground reserves are never augmented by such purchases. Owners of aboveground storage capacity-unlike extractors-are, therefore, always searching for opportunities to buy low, store their acquisitions, and sell high later.
Tests of the Model
What distinguishes models of natural resource extraction from static models is the role of expectations and anticipatory behavior. Agents are assumed to have foresight and to base current behavior in part on expectations about future prices. These expectations greatly complicate the analysis of resource models and influence their predictions. Pragmatists will certainly want to know whether such anticipatory behavior is ever observed and, if so, whether it is sufficiently important to be taken into account when formulating policy.
In my view, such anticipatory behavior is frequently observed; indeed, it constitutes qualitative evidence in support of the Hotelling model. Failure to take such behavior into account has contributed to important policy errors.
Suppose, for example, the government uses a buffer stock to peg the price of a natural resource above its initial market level, as happened earlier in this century when gold prices were pegged at $35 an ounce. Suppose the government commits to purchase any amount of the resource offered for sale and to sell any amount (up to its entire accumulated inventory) demanded at this official price. What would be the consequences of this policy?
In the new equilibrium, the price could not remain permanently at the pegged level because cumulative demand would eventually exceed the government's reserves (or, indeed, any finite amount). Nor could the price remain at the pegged level and then jump to the choke price when government reserves were depleted, because such a jump would be anticipated and would provoke unlimited stockpiling. Instead, the Hotelling model predicts the following sequence of events: producers will extract and sell their entire reserves to the government at the outset; the government will then begin reselling to consumers at the official price; at a predictable moment, private speculators will "attack" the government stockpile and purchase all the remaining reserves; and the speculators will thereafter resell the acquired official reserves to consumers at prices that rise gradually to compensate for interest and storage costs. The speculative attack is predicted to occur when the government reserves decline to the point at which the official price would exactly equal the market price if the remaining official stocks were held entirely by private stockpilers. Under this scenario each private agent is maximizing, the government is following its policy rule, and the market clears in each period.
If speculators have foresight, their anticipatory behavior is predicted to result in an attack on the government scheme to peg the official price (Salant and Henderson 1978) . This prediction applies equally when uncertainty is introduced (Salant 1983) . Attacks are likewise predicted to occur in response to buffer stock schemes to defend ceilings or bands on the prices of commodities or natural resources. 1 0 If speculators lacked foresight, however, no such speculative attacks would occur.
Actual government attempts to defend price ceilings by sales from official stockpiles provide many opportunities to assess this qualitative prediction. The sudden speculative attacks provoked by official schemes to impose ceilings on the prices of various commodities (such as gold, tin, and coffee) and to fix many exchange rates constitute qualitative evidence of anticipatory behavior too important to ignore.
Similar points can be made about stockpiling in anticipation of governmentimposed reductions in availability. If quotas, sanctions, tariffs, or regulations are anticipated to limit the availability of a storable good from some known future date onward, the Hotelling model predicts that inventories will be accumulated as that date approaches. If, however, that date remains uncertain, the model predicts that inventories will be maintained continually. In that case, the model also predicts that speculators will increase their stockpiles if the prospects of reduced availability increase. None of these actions would occur if stockpilers lacked foresight.
Government policies that limit the availability of storable goods provide countless opportunities to assess these qualitative predictions. Observed stockpiling behavior commonly corresponds to the model's predictions. For example, as the day approached when Prohibition was about to go into effect, anticipatory stockpiling surged. Similarly, although no one in the United States knows when additional regulations will reduce the availability of firearms, the perception that such regulations are now more likely to be enacted than they once were has set off a surge in anticipatory stockpiling. Examples of such behavior by owners of stocks above or below ground are abundant. Policymakers would be foolish to ignore them.
Do Declining Prices Refute the Model?
As Barnett and Morse (1963) emphasized, real prices in many resource markets have declined over long intervals. These declines have sometimes been taken as evidence against the Hotelling model. Although declining real prices may be inconsistent with particular assumptions about extraction technology and the nature of the resource, when these assumptions are suitably modified, the model does in fact predict declining prices. Four alternative reasons why resource prices might decline are considered.
* Cost-reducing technical change. Technical change, as noted earlier, might reduce extraction costs and cause prices to decline. * Expansion of extraction capacity. Resource prices might also decline-even in the absence of technical change-if extraction capacity were limited initially and the marginal cost of expanding it increased with the rate of capacity expansion. In such circumstances, the prospect of a lower real price next year might induce the extractor to sell up to current capacity constraints, and the expansion of capacity between one year and the next would result in a price reduction (Switzer and Salant 1986 ). * Revised estimates of old reserves and discoveries of new reserves. Discoveries of new oil or revisions in estimates of existing oil reserves may reduce prices. Although the Hotelling model assumes that all reserves are known from the outset, reserves are rarely estimated precisely, and owners are often relieved to learn that their reserves are larger than their most pessimistic estimates (Gilbert 1979) . Moreover, exploration results in the discovery of additional reserves at unknown times (Arrow and Chang 1982) . * Durables that are costly to extract rapidly. Prices of depletable resources, such as gold, that some consumers enjoy as possessions, might decline initially as the stock held above ground increased. For a price decline to occur, there must be diminishing returns to additional extraction or capacity limits so that resource owners will not extract the entire stock at the outset. As underground reserves are extracted and the aboveground stock expanded, the rentals that these stocks yield decline, and so too may their price (Levhari and Pindyck 1981) .
A Formal Test
Although econometric tests have been used to question the predictions of the Hotelling model, the data used in these tests render their results questionable. Miller and Upton (1985) devised a clever cross-sectional test of the Hotelling theory. Using the market price of the firm's shares as an estimate of the market value of the extractor, the theory predicts that the market value per unit ol reserves of any operating extractor ought to equal that firm's current net price when marginal costs are constant. Miller and Upton deduced how uncertainty or rising marginal costs could modify this relationship because of diminishing returns or depletion effects and concluded that the Hotelling model could account for a substantial portion of the variation in market values of the sample ol firms. They also found that their regression provided a method of predicting the market value of extraction firms superior to Herold's Oil Industry Comparative Appraisals, a commercial service widely quoted in the financial press that uses more extensive information and more complicated methods. This is not to say, on the one hand, that complexity inevitably leads to poorei predictions or, on the other, that stylized Hotelling models of the kind reviewec here are the best that can be devised to understand real-world resource markets, The merit of these stylized models is that they capture essential elements of a resource market, they are easily understood and manipulated, and they can be used as a framework for more detailed analysis. Thus Nordhaus (1979) has built a complex Hotelling-style competitive model that uses detailed information about alternative sources of energy, reserves, and costs. Salant (1982) has developed a model for the U.S. Department of Energy that extends the Hotelling framework to encompass the noncompetitive market structure of the world oil market. Both of these are complicated simulation models involving hundreds of equations; neither can be solved without a computer. But because both of these complex models adhere rigorously to the Hotelling framework, their structure and predictions can be understood by anyone familiar with the stylized models reviewed here. In both of these models, for example, one can have confidence that each competitive extractor currently operating will behave as predicted by the Hotelling model, a behavior that Upton and Miller found at work in realworld data. Thus, although Hotelling's stylized model is intuitively appealing to academic economists, the framework also has something very useful (relative to available alternatives) to offer market analysts and policymakers.
Applications to Environmental Planning
Most environmental problems arise when production or consumption of a good generates a flow of pollution that eventually accumulates in the air or water. Damage typically arises not from the current flow of pollution but from its long-term accumulation. Economists contend that the competitive market often fails to maximize social welfare in such circumstances because agents making the production or consumption decisions do not take into account the costs that their actions impose on others.
The profession has not been as quick to recognize the central technological feature of these pollution problems. Keeler, Spence, and Zeckhauser (1972) were the first to emphasize the resemblance between the dynamic aspects of pollution and extraction problems.
To illustrate, suppose that a good (for simplicity, not a natural resource) can be produced domestically at constant marginal cost and that consuming it generates benefits that are subject to diminishing returns. Suppose, further, that a flow of pollution is also generated in fixed proportion to the rate of production and that any damages from this pollution affect third parties. Suppose that this pollution generates no social costs until it accumulates beyond a known threshold-at which point the cost imposed on the third parties is unconscionably high. The competitive market, left to function freely, will not produce the level of output that is socially optimal. The socially optimal production path would coincide with the equilibrium extraction path in the simplest Hotelling model.
Once more detailed considerations are introduced, the resemblance between dynamic extraction and dynamic pollution problems becomes less striking. For example, as Dasgupta (1982) emphasizes, the environment has a capacity to recover from many forms of pollution, and society has the opportunity, at a real cost, either to abate the flow of new pollution or to clean up the stock of past accumulations. Although these features of environmental problems may have no counterparts in extraction, the social planning problem associated with the Hotelling model can easily be modified to accommodate these additional considerations.
The literature summarized in this article is therefore not only useful in predicting prices and behavior in well-functioning resource markets, it can also identify socially optimal allocations when environmental problems make the market work poorly.
Further Reading
The literature elaborating on Hotelling's classic article has been surveyed repeatedly in the last two decades. Readable introductions are provided in articles by Solow (1974) and Devarajan and Fisher (1981) . Short monographs by Bohi and Toman (1984) and Hartwick (1989) comprehensively cover Hotelling's model and its extensions. Textbooks include Hartwick and Olewiler (1986) and Tietenberg (1992) at the undergraduate level and Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and Conrad and Clark (1987) at the graduate level. Course outlines, exams, and problems are collected and published by Tower (1990) . Careful evaluations of the application of the Hotelling model to the world oil market are contained in a monograph by Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani (1991) as well as in Epple and Londregan's (1993) contribution to the three-volume handbook edited by Kneese and Sweeney (1993) . Dasgupta (1982) draws the connections between resource and environmental economics. A list of journal articles in the field through 1992 is provided in Hoagland and Stavins (1992) .
Notes
Stephen W. Salant is a professor of economics at the University of Michigan.
1. Recall that one dollar received in period t is equivalent to 1/(1 + r)t-1 dollars in period 1 where r is the (constant) interest rate, or that one dollar in the initial period is equivalent to (1 + r)t-I dollars in period t. We refer to (1 +r) as the interest factor At an interest rate of 10 percent, a firm will be equally well off if it earns $100 today (which can generate $10 of interest income) or if it earns $110 one year from now.
2. Assume for now that storing extracted oil above ground and selling it later is prohibitively expensive. As will become clear, the extra costs of premature extraction and aboveground storage make such behavior optimal only when prices are expected to rise rapidly.
3. This case is based on the following assumptions: The marginal cost of extraction is constant and independent of the rate of extraction (that is, the first barrel of oil is just as costly to extract as the next one). Neither the marginal cost nor the demand for the resource shifts in real terms over time. The demand for oil is zero at sufficiently high prices. The real interest rate does not vary over time, and each firm's oil reserve is finite.
4. Any initial price has a corresponding price path. Because the net price on this path rises each year at the interest rate, the present value of the net price in every year is constant.
5. If aboveground stockpilers anticipate rapid price increases, however, they are likely to purchase as much of the resource as is available, and in so doing prevent such price increases.
6. Herfindahl (1967) discovered this result for the case where resource pools can be extracted at different but constant marginal costs. Weitzman (1976) discovered a generalization of Herfindahl's result when demand for one unit is continual and the marginal cost of extracting an additional barrel at a given pool of oil can vary in any specified way as cumulative extraction changes.
7. "Fool's Gold: When Central Banks Lose Their Lust for Gold, Gold Bugs Should Beware," Economist, January 23, 1993, p. 1 7 .
8. Suppose, for example, that global gold mining ceased and that whenever an extractor wanted to sell an ounce of gold, the government gave it to him in exchange for $300 and title to one ounce of his underground gold. The extractor would not be affected by this scheme and should sell exactly as before and at the same prices. The extractor would still pay $300 an ounce, but payment would go to the government instead of the miners; the extractor would cease to own each ounce of gold sold (having relinquished title to it). Governments would receive $300 an ounce for the gold they would sell during the next twenty years and would then pay the cost of extracting the gold (to which they had gained title) to restock their reserves. Even at a 4 percent interest rate, governments would earn approximately $75 billion from this scheme.
9. It is important to distinguish two dimensions of costs: the cost of building or adding to capacity, and the cost of operations. If, for example, the backstop represents nuclear energy, the first category would be the cost of building the reactor, and the second would be the cost of producing nuclear energy. (The two categories are assumed to be independent.) 10. Krugman (1979) recognized that Salant and Henderson's reasoning could explain speculative runs on fixed exchange-rate regimes. The subsequent literature on speculative attacks in the foreign exchange market is nicely surveyed in Krugman and Obstfeld (1991) .
